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a complete understanding of the judgment process necessitates that 
we understand the pre-decisional processes involved in memory. 
Accordingly, appealing to vague heuristics such as availability and 
representativeness as mechanisms of memory do little to further our 
understanding of judgment.
The last several years has seen a growth in models of judgment 
grounded in memory theory. Dougherty et al. (1999) extended a 
model of recognition memory, Minerva 2, to deal with conditional 
probability judgment and categorization. Juslin and Persson (2002) 
extended a model of categorization to model probability judgment 
and confidence. Pleskac (2007) specified Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s 
(2002) recognition heuristic within the context of signal detection 
theory, and Schooler and Hertwig (2005) did so within the context 
of ACT-R. Finally, Thomas et al. (2008) proposed an integrative 
model, HyGene, that links the processes of hypothesis generation, 
information search, and judgment to both long-term memory 
retrieval and working memory. Still, though, there have been rela-
tively few experimental studies investigating the interrelationship 
between memory and judgment.
In this paper we bring together research from the areas of deci-
sion making, attention, and memory. Our view is that memory 
processes serve as input into the processes of judgment and deci-
sion making. Thus, errors and biases that crop up in the memory 
retrieval process, or constraints placed on decision makers that 
limit their time or cognitive resources, will cascade into errors 
and biases in judgment and decision making. Specifically, we were 
interested in examining the relationship between working memory, 
divided attention, and probability judgment in an inductive infer-
ence task that required participants to generate hypotheses from 
memory (Gettys and Fisher, 1979; Mehle, 1982; Dougherty and 
Hunter, 2003a,b). Such generation processes underlie a number 
ImplIcatIons of cognItIve load for HypotHesIs
generatIon and probabIlIty Judgment
A fundamental assumption of many models of judgment is that 
judgment is dependent on memory. This assumption was first real-
ized by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) in their work on the avail-
ability and representativeness heuristics, as well as subsequent work 
on confidence and probability judgments (Tversky and Koehler, 
1994; Dougherty et al., 1999; Dougherty, 2001; Sieck and Yates, 
2001; Goldstein and Gigerenzer, 2002; Juslin and Persson, 2002), 
hypothesis generation (Gettys and Fisher, 1979; Weber et al., 1993; 
Dougherty and Hunter, 2003a,b; Dougherty and Sprenger, 2006; 
Thomas et al., 2008), and even choice (Weber et al., 2007).
Despite the importance of memory for judgment processes, a 
detailed analysis of the role of memory processes in judgment is 
lacking. Indeed, even some influential models of probability judg-
ment fail to explicate the precise nature of the memory processes 
that underpin judgments. For example, in Tversky and Koehler’s 
(1994) support theory, the perceived support for a particular 
hypothesis is assumed to be based on an underlying memory vari-
able. However, rather than specifying these underlying memory 
variables, Tversky and Koehler (1994) suggested that support was 
assessed using judgmental heuristics such as availability and repre-
sentativeness. Similarly, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) proposed 
the recognition heuristic as a mechanism for choice, but did not 
specify the memorial basis of the recognition heuristic (Pleskac, 
2007; Dougherty et al., 2008). On the one hand, it seems reason-
able to study judgment processes independent of their memorial 
inputs, and much has been learned from such investigations. On 
the other hand, the predictions of any judgment model can only be 
as good as the assumptions upon which it rests. If one assumes that 
memory processes provide the input to the judgment process, then 
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doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00129of  real-world judgment tasks, including medical diagnosis (Weber 
et al., 1993), accountants’ generation of going concern problems 
(Libby, 1985), and fault generation by power-plant operators 
(Patrick et al., 1999). To our knowledge, no research has yet exam-
ined the effect of dividing attention on probability judgment.
We start with the assumption that eliciting a probability judg-
ment of an elementary event prompts people to generate its logical 
alternatives from long-term memory. For example, if a clinician 
learns that a patient has shortness of breath and congestion, and 
is asked to assess the likelihood that the patient has bronchitis, we 
assume that the clinician will generate logical contenders to bron-
chitis (e.g., asthma and emphysema). These alternatives are assumed 
to form the evaluative basis for comparing the strength of evidence 
in favor of bronchitis to its contenders. Thus, we expect memory 
variables to influence the outcome of the judgment process to the 
extent that they affect which and how many hypotheses are retrieved 
from memory and included as part of the evaluation process.
The second assumption concerns the precise nature of the judg-
ment process. Following Tversky and Koehler (1994), we assume 
that participants utilize a comparison process to derive their prob-
ability judgments. Formally, this comparison process is given by 
Eq. 1 (see Tversky and Koehler, 1994):
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where s(Ha) and s(Hb) correspond to the strength of evidence for 
hypotheses Ha and Hb respectively. Returning to the physician 
assessing the likelihood of bronchitis (Ha), the set of alternatives to 
bronchitis (Hb) consists of the implicit disjunction of not  bronchitis. 
Tversky and Koehler (1994) found that people’s judgments tend to 
be subadditive; the probability of an implicit disjunction tends to be 
lower than the sum of the probabilities assigned to its elements. For 
example, if one were to judge p(not bronchitis, bronchitis) it would 
be judged as less likely than the sum of the probabilities assigned to 
p(asthma, bronchitis), p(emphysema, bronchitis), and p(all other 
non-bronchitis possibilities). Thus the judged probability of the 
inclusive hypothesis, p(not bronchitis, bronchitis) is subadditive 
with respect to the sum of the judged probabilities of its elements.
We assume that merely being asked to judge the likelihood of 
bronchitis (Ha) prompts the decision maker to generate hypotheses 
implicit in the set of Hb to be included in the comparison process. 
Note that according to Eq. 1, the judged probability of Ha should 
be negatively related to the number and strength of the alternatives 
from Hb included in the comparison process. Considerable research 
suggests that the comparison process is well characterized in terms 
of Eq. 1 (Dougherty et al., 1999; Thomas et al., 2008; Tversky and 
Koehler, 1994; Windschitl and Wells, 1998).
Dougherty and colleagues have argued that hypothesis genera-
tion and working memory processes constrain how many and which 
hypotheses are included in the comparison process (Dougherty 
and Hunter, 2003a,b; Dougherty and Sprenger, 2006; Sprenger and 
Dougherty, 2006; Thomas et al., 2008). For example, Dougherty 
and Hunter (2003a), Dougherty et al. (1997) demonstrated that 
people tended to generate strong (high-probability) alternatives 
as opposed to weak (low-probability) alternatives. Moreover, the 
number of hypotheses included in the comparison process was 
positively related both to individual differences in working mem-
ory capacity and to the amount of time allowed for generation 
(Dougherty and Hunter, 2003b; Sprenger and Dougherty, 2006). 
In all these cases, the number and strength of alternatives generated 
and included in the comparison process was negatively correlated 
with the magnitude of participants’ judgments.
More recently, Thomas et al. (2008) proposed the HyGene 
model to account for the relationship between long-term mem-
ory retrieval (i.e., hypothesis generation), working memory, and 
judgment. HyGene is able to account for a variety of effects in 
the probability judgment literature (see Dougherty et al., 2010), 
including the alternative outcomes effect (Windschitl and Wells, 
1998), subadditivity effects (Tversky and Koehler, 1994), and the 
negative correlation between individual differences in working 
memory span and judgment (Dougherty and Hunter, 2003a,b). 
According to HyGene, the negative correlation between individual 
differences in working memory span and judgment arises from 
limitations on the number of alternatives included in the compar-
ison process: participants with higher working memory capacities 
are assumed to include more alternatives in the comparison pro-
cess. Within HyGene, the number of hypotheses included in the 
comparison process can be determined both by working memory 
constraints on the comparison process and by how well informa-
tion is encoded in long-term memory. The capacity hypothesis 
postulates that working memory capacity constrains the number 
of hypotheses that one can include in the comparison process, 
irrespective of the number that are retrieved from long-term 
memory. Thus, it is theoretically possible for one to retrieve a 
relatively large number of hypotheses from long-term memory, 
yet include only a few of these hypotheses in the comparison 
process due to working memory limitations.
HyGene postulates that the number of alternatives included in 
the comparison process will be constrained by how many alter-
natives can actually be retrieved from long-term memory. This 
possibility suggests that probability judgments that require one to 
generate information from memory will be sensitive to how well 
that information was initially encoded in memory. Considerable 
research indicates that encoding is a resource-dependent process 
(Craik et al., 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Fernandes and 
Moscovitch, 2000; Kane and Engle, 2000). For example, Craik et al. 
(1996) showed that divided attention during encoding (compared 
to full attention) led to substantial decreases in later retrieval, 
whereas divided attention during retrieval led to minimal decre-
ments in the number of items retrieved. This finding prompted 
Craik et al. (1996) to suggest that the process of encoding was 
modulated by attention whereas retrieval was obligatory and pro-
tected from the effects of divided attention (for a different view, 
see Fernandes and Moscovitch, 2000).
The idea that attention is necessary for encoding raises the 
possibility that differences in judgment magnitude between par-
ticipants with large and small working memory capacities arises 
from differences in the encoding process, rather than constraints 
on the comparison process. If the retrieval of the alternatives to the 
to-be-judged items is dependent on how well they were encoded 
in memory prior to the judgment task, then one would expect any 
sort of memory-dependent judgment to be sensitive to how well 
the alternatives were encoded
1. Given the evidence that individu-
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on three core principles: (1) data observed in the environment 
serve as retrieval cues that prompt the retrieval of hypotheses 
from long-term memory. (2) The number of hypotheses that 
one can actively entertain is constrained by working memory 
capacity and task characteristics. (3) Hypotheses maintained in 
working memory are used as input into a comparison process 
to derive probability judgments. Principles 1 and 2 describe 
what we referred to as   pre-decisional processes: they determine 
what and how much information is generated from memory and 
included in the judgment process. While these processes can 
be considered independent of the judgment process, the judg-
ment process clearly depends on these pre-decisional processes. 
Specifically, retrieved hypotheses serve as the evaluative basis for 
determining judged probability. Model details are provided in 
the Section “Appendix.”
To illustrate HyGene’s predictions we manipulated the frequency 
of alternative hypotheses, working memory capacity, and encod-
ing quality within HyGene. Table 1 briefly describes HyGene’s 
parameters and presents the parameter values used for the simu-
lation. The two parameters relevant for the current simulations 
are working memory capacity (φ) and encoding level (L). Within 
HyGene, working memory capacity is defined as the number of 
hypotheses that can be maintained in an active state at any given 
time. The effect of working memory capacity on judgment was 
assessed across two levels to simulate low capacity (φ = 2) and high 
capacity (φ = 4). To simulate the effect of manipulating encoding, 
we varied the encoding parameter, L (the probability that a fea-
ture of an experienced event is encoded into the corresponding 
memory trace), across a range of five levels: L = 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9. 
Prior work has illustrated that judgment magnitude is affected by 
the strength of the alternatives one considers (see Dougherty and 
Hunter, 2003a). Thus, we manipulated the strength of   alternatives 
als with larger working memory capacity appear to have better 
encoding processes compared to individuals with smaller work-
ing memory capacity, any correlation between working memory 
capacity and memory, as well as working memory capacity and 
judgment, may be the result of encoding processes. For example, 
better encoding of alternatives for high-span participants would 
lead them to retrieve more alternative hypotheses (i.e., elements 
from Hb) for inclusion in the comparison process, which according 
to Eq. 1, could lead to lower judgments. The differential encoding 
explanation is consistent with research showing that participants 
with larger working memory capacity devote more attentional 
resources to encoding as a means of dealing with proactive inter-
ference (Kane and Engle, 2000). Taken together, differences in 
the number of hypotheses retrieved between high- and low-span 
participants, as well as differences in the magnitude of probabil-
ity judgments, may result from encoding processes and not con-
straints on the number of hypotheses that one can include in the 
comparison process.
sImulatIng tHe effect of WorkIng memory and 
encodIng on probabIlIty Judgment
To illustrate the relationship between working memory, encod-
ing, and probability judgment, we used HyGene2 to simulate how 
manipulating working memory and encoding quality might affect 
Table 1 | HyGene parameters, definitions, boundary values, and values used in the simulation.
Parameter Definition Boundaries Values used in simulation
L Quality of memory encoding: the probability that each feature in the experienced event is 
encoded into the corresponding memory trace vector.
0 ≤ L ≤ 1 L = 0.5
L = 0.6
L = 0.7
L = 0.8
L = 0.9
TMAX A retrieval parameter that determines how long the model searches semantic memory. 
Generation terminates when the total number of retrieval failures (the model fails to 
retrieve a novel hypothesis) exceeds TMAX TMAX can be used to model task 
characteristics such as time pressure, and individual variables such as effort or motivation.
TMAX ≥ 0 TMAX = 10
Ac The activation criterion for memory traces in episodic memory. Episodic traces are placed 
in the activated subset if their activation exceeds this threshold, Ac.
0 ≤ Ac ≤ 1 Ac = 0.166
φ This working memory capacity parameter specifies the upper limit of how many 
hypotheses can be held in working memory.
φ ≥ 0 φ = 2 (low working memory 
capacity)
φ = 4 (high workingmemory 
capacity)
ActMinH The activation criterion for hypotheses to be placed in working memory. ActMinH is always 
set to 0 initially, and then is dynamically updated based on the activation values of 
hypotheses in the SOC.
ActMinH ≥ 0 ActMinH = 0 (to start)
1Throughout the paper, when we refer to “better encoding” or “higher encoding 
levels,” we mean that individuals have stored more item and/or context information 
for items/alternatives that they are attending. In contrast, when we refer to “worse 
encoding,” or “decreases in encoding,” we mean that individuals have stored less 
item and/or context information for items/alternatives that they are attending.
2We used the HyGene model for simulations because it is the only model that we 
know of that has been designed to model the realistic situation in which people 
must retrieve hypotheses from long-term memory and feed these hypotheses into 
long-term memory.
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judgment magnitude because increases in encoding quality lead 
to a disproportionate increase in the strength of the focal relative 
to the alternatives. Although the model generates more alterna-
tives with increases in encoding quality, the increase in the strength 
of the focal hypothesis overwhelms the effect of including more 
alternatives in the comparison process. The non-intuitive nature 
of this prediction serves as a strong test of the version of HyGene 
presented by Thomas et al. (2008).
Previous research found that individual differences in work-
ing memory capacity are negatively correlated with probability 
judgment magnitude (e.g., Dougherty and Hunter, 2003a,b). One 
hypothesis, supported by the HyGene simulation, is that increased 
capacity is related to an increased number of alternatives in the 
comparison process, and consequently decreased judgments. 
However, another plausible explanation is that participants high 
in working memory capacity have better knowledge of extensional 
rules of probability (e.g., additivity within a sample space), math-
ematical ability, or general knowledge (individuals high in working 
memory capacity tend to perform better on measures of intelligence 
and general ability, including verbal and quantitative SATs; Rohde 
and Thompson, 2006). In the present experiments, we manipulated 
cognitive load, rather than exclusively using a correlational design. 
If high capacity participants make lower probability judgments 
because of quantitative knowledge, they should be unaffected by 
reduced attention during the task. In contrast, if high capacity par-
ticipants make lower judgments because of generation processes, 
dividing attention should reduce generation ability and lead them 
to make higher judgments than when using full attention.
experIment 1
In Experiment 1, we tested the influence of divided attention at 
encoding and divided attention during retrieval on probability 
judgment. We manipulated cognitive load by requiring participants 
to remember strings of 1–8 letters while simultaneously engaging 
in a probability judgment task. We anticipated that increases in 
cognitive load would decrease the number of alternative hypotheses 
included in the comparison process and thereby lead to increases 
in judged probability.
using two  different frequency distributions to examine its effect on 
judgment. For the balanced distribution condition, eight hypoth-
eses were stored in memory with trace frequencies of 10, 5, 5, 4, 4, 
4, 4, and 1. For the unbalanced condition, eight hypotheses were 
stored in memory with trace frequencies of 15, 10, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 
and 1. These distributions closely approximate the form of those 
used in the behavioral experiments presented in this paper3. Each 
simulation consisted of 1,000 trials.
Figure 1 presents the simulation results for the effect of distri-
bution on the sum of the eight probability judgments, as a function 
of working memory capacity. Note that to be additive, the model’s 
eight judgments should sum to 100%, and the degree to which they 
exceed this demonstrates that the predicted judgments are subad-
ditive. HyGene predicts that judgments will have higher absolute 
magnitude (and thus will produce greater subadditivity) in the 
balanced distribution than in the unbalanced distribution. Also, 
HyGene predicts a modest decrease in judgment magnitude and 
subadditivity as working memory capacity increases. These model 
predictions are consistent with the negative correlation between 
individual differences in working memory capacity and judgment 
magnitude found in prior work (Dougherty and Hunter, 2003a,b).
Figure 2 plots HyGene’s probability judgment predictions as a 
function of encoding quality for both balanced and unbalanced 
distributions. HyGene makes two important predictions regarding 
the effect of encoding on hypotheses generation and judgment. 
First, HyGene predicts that participants will retrieve more alterna-
tives to the focal hypothesis under conditions of high encoding (not 
shown). Thus, hypothesis generation is expected to show a positive 
relationship with encoding. Second, and less intuitively, HyGene 
predicts that high encoding will lead to increases in judgment mag-
nitude and subadditivity. This later prediction is non-intuitive, 
since the formula for the comparison process (Eq. 1) predicts that 
increases in the number of hypotheses included in the denominator 
should lead to a decrease in the perceived probability of the focal 
FiGure 1 | Mean predicted sum of probability judgments as a function of 
the strength of alternative hypotheses and working memory capacity for 
the HyGene simulation. The distribution of alternatives for the balanced 
condition was: 10, 5, 5, 4, 4, 4, 4, 1. The distribution for the unbalanced 
condition was: 15, 10, 7 , 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.
FiGure 2 | Mean predicted sum of probability judgments as a function of 
encoding quality for balanced and unbalanced distributions for the 
HyGene simulation.
3The absolute frequencies used in the simulation are of less importance than the 
relative frequencies.
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items learned in this phase served as the stimuli for the judgment 
task. The order of presentation of the meals (breakfast, lunch, dinner, 
and dessert) always occurred in the same order.
Following the simulated restaurant task, participants were told to 
imagine they had a new job waiting on tables in another restaurant, 
and they had four new customers who come in regularly and order 
from menus that are different from the first menus. These four new 
customers from the second diner were included to serve as “irrel-
evant” alternatives. This second simulated restaurant was identical 
to the first except for three features: (1) the four patrons at this diner 
were all female, whereas the patrons at the prior diner were all male, 
(2) none of the eight items on each of the four menus at the second 
diner were on the menus of the first diner, and (3) each of the eight 
items on the four menus was ordered exactly twice over the course 
of 16 simulated days. This second restaurant task was included for 
two reasons. First, it served as a distracter task between learning 
the to-be-judged items and the subsequent judgment task, thereby 
eliminating possible recency effects. Second, it served to provide a 
set of irrelevant stimuli that we hypothesized would interfere with 
the retrieval of the items from the main restaurant task. Ideally, 
participants should be able to discriminate and then inhibit items 
from the irrelevant menu when making their judgments. However, 
to the degree that participants are unable to discriminate and inhibit 
these irrelevant items, retrieval of these items might influence par-
ticipants’ judgments (Dougherty and Sprenger, 2006).
Cognitive-load task. Participants were required to retain a list of 
letters for later recall. The number of letters that had to be main-
tained for recall varied across four load levels: 1, 4, 6, or 8 letters. 
This manipulation of load constituted our main independent vari-
able and was manipulated within participants.
Judgment task. For the judgment task, participants were required 
to make judgments about the likelihood that a given person would 
order a given item from the menu. Probability judgments were 
made by pressing 1 of 11 keys on the keyboard corresponding to 
probabilities ranging from 0 to 100% (in 10% increments). With 
one exception, the order of the presentation of the 32 menu items 
was randomized anew for each participant. The one exception to 
the judgment procedure outlined above concerns the first four 
items judged. All participants judged one frequency-10 item from 
each of the four menus to begin the task.
Implicit memory task. The implicit memory task consisted of 
16 word fragments: 8 corresponded to menu items on the target 
menu and 8 to menu items from the irrelevant restaurant. Words 
from the menu were presented with approximately half the letters 
missing. The missing letters were randomly removed from each 
word. Participants were asked to complete the word fragments. 
The implicit memory task was included as a measure of what items 
(and how many) were primed by the judgment task.
The cognitive-load task was performed simultaneously with the 
judgment and implicit memory tasks. For each of the 32 items 
judged, participants first observed letters to remember for the cog-
nitive-load task, then made a likelihood judgment, then recalled 
the letters for the cognitive-load task, and finally completed a word 
metHod
Participants
Participants were 167 individuals who were recruited from 
the University of Maryland campus community by advertise-
ments posted around campus and in the University newspaper. 
Participants were paid $10 for participating in the experiment.
Design
The experimental design was a randomized block design, with 
cognitive-load manipulated within participants across four levels. 
The cognitive-load task involved a “preload” manipulation that 
required participants to maintain 1, 4, 6, or 8 letters for short-term 
recall while simultaneously engaging in a probability judgment task.
Procedure
The entire experiment took place on computers and lasted 1.5 h. 
The experiment consisted of five main tasks: (1) a simulated restau-
rant task in which participants learned the frequency with which 
hypothetical customers ordered specific menu items at a diner, 
(2) a cognitive-load task in which participants were required to 
remember a list of 1, 4, 6, or 8 letters for short-term recall, (3) a 
judgment task, in which participants were asked to judge the like-
lihood that a given item would be ordered at the restaurant by a 
given person, (4) an implicit memory task which was used to test 
whether irrelevant items4 were activated by the judgment task, and 
(5) the operation-span (o-span) task which was used to measure 
working memory capacity.
Prior to engaging in the experiment, participants completed 
a practice session that introduced them to the various tasks they 
would perform during the experiment. Participants practiced each 
of the individual tasks alone, and then practiced the tasks exactly 
as they would be performed in the experiment. The only differ-
ence between the experiment and the practice session was that 
the practice session used a simulated vacation scenario, in which 
participants learned the various travel destinations of hypothetical 
travelers, rather than the simulated restaurant scenario.
Restaurant task. For the simulated restaurant task, participants were 
told to pretend that they had a job waiting on tables at a particular 
country diner, and that they notice that four male customers come 
in regularly for four different meals and order from four different 
menus. There were no overlapping menu items across the four menus 
and each menu contained eight items. For example, Bob always 
ordered one of eight possible items from the breakfast menu, Steve 
always ordered one of eight possible items from the lunch menu, Tim 
always ordered one of eight possible items from the dinner menu, and 
Dan always ordered one of the eight possible items from the dessert 
menu. The restaurant task displayed each customer’s order over the 
course of 50 consecutive days. The menu items were presented in 
random order with a frequency distribution of 10-10-8-8-4-4-3-3. 
The assignment of items to presentation frequency within a menu 
was counterbalanced such that each item was presented at each objec-
4An “irrelevant” item was an item from a different menu that was not part of the set 
of possible hypotheses for the judgment at hand. For instance, if a participant was 
judging the likelihood that a diner would order eggs for breakfast, , and the partici-
pant thought of “French toast” as an alternative item, but French toast was not on 
this diner’s menu, “French toast” would be defined as irrelevant.
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As a manipulation check, we examined the percent correct recall 
on the cognitive-load task. There were three main findings: first, 
the percent of letters correctly recalled on the cognitive-load task 
decreased significantly as the load level increased, F(3,163) = 284.52, 
p < 0.05. This indicates that the cognitive-load manipulation was 
successful. Second, working memory span was a significant predic-
tor of the percent of correct letters recalled on the cognitive-load 
task, F(1,165) = 37.15, p < 0.05. Finally, the effect of cognitive-load 
interacted with working memory span, F(3,163) = 11.63, p < 0.05, 
in that participants with higher working memory span were less 
affected by the increase in cognitive load.
Implicit memory task
The mean number of set relevant and set irrelevant items identified 
in the implicit memory task for each level of cognitive load is shown 
in Table 2. Analysis of covariance using o-span as the covariate 
revealed a main effect of relevance on implicit memory performance, 
F(1,162) = 15.42, p < 0.05. Participants correctly identified more 
word fragments belonging to the relevant set than to the irrelevant 
set. In addition, working memory span was a significant positive pre-
dictor of implicit memory performance, F(1,162) = 6.02, p < 0.05. 
However, there was no effect of cognitive load on implicit memory 
performance, and no significant interactions between cognitive load, 
working memory span, and relevance (all p’s > 0.20). For this reason, 
all subsequent covariance analyses used the mean number of irrel-
evant alternatives identified collapsed across cognitive-load level.
Probability judgments
We analyzed two aspects of judgment accuracy: (1) the degree 
to which participants’ judgments were subadditive (summed to 
greater than 100%), and (2) the degree to which participants’ judg-
ments discriminated among different levels of objective probability 
(i.e., judgments’ relative accuracy). These two measures capture 
different components of judgment accuracy. Subadditivity captures 
the degree to which participants’ judgments satisfy the additivity 
axiom of probability theory. However, judgments can be additive 
without accurately discriminating between events with differ-
ent objective probabilities (see Dougherty and Sprenger, 2006). 
fragment for the implicit memory task. As previously mentioned, 
cognitive load was manipulated within participants. Each partici-
pant made eight judgments under each possible load level (1, 4, 
6, or 8 letters). Further, all items from one meal type were judged 
under the same load level. For example, a participant might judge 
each of the 8 breakfast items under a load of 4 letters each of the 8 
dinner items under a load of 8 letters, each of the 8 dessert items 
under a load of 1 item, and each of the 8 lunch items under a load 
of 6 letters. The assignment of load level to menu (breakfast, lunch, 
dinner, and snack) was counterbalanced across participants.
Operation span. After completing the experimental task, each par-
ticipant completed the operation-span (o-span) task as a measure 
of working memory span (Turner and Engle, 1989). The o-span 
task required that participants retain a growing list of words while 
verifying arithmetic problem solutions. For example, on succes-
sive presentations participants would be shown: “(4 × 3) − 3 = 9? 
Door; (4/2) + 3 = 7? Shoe.” Participants were required to read the 
arithmetic problem and its solution aloud, verify whether the solu-
tion was true, and then read the word aloud. After saying the word, 
the experimenter advanced to the next operation-word pair. This 
continued until the participant was prompted to recall the words 
from that set in the order in which they were presented. Participants 
were presented with 15 sets of equation-word pairs with set sizes 
ranging from 2 to 6. Each set size occurred three times randomly 
throughout the task. Performance on the o-span task was computed 
by the number of words recalled in the correct serial position for 
which the corresponding arithmetic problem was correctly verified. 
The maximum possible score was 60, with higher scores represent-
ing larger working memory capacity. A detailed description of the 
operation-span task is presented in Turner and Engle (1989).
results and dIscussIon
Our primary analyses center on the effect of cognitive load on 
judged probability. However, several other aspects of the data are 
worth noting. Table 2 presents the mean number of letters recalled 
for the cognitive-load task, number of relevant and irrelevant alter-
natives identified in the implicit memory task, judgment sums, 
gamma correlations, and the o-span scores.
Table 2 | The mean number of relevant and irrelevant alternatives identified in the implicit memory task as a function of cognitive-load level, the 
percentage of letters recalled in the cognitive-load task as a function of cognitive-load level, mean judgment sums as a function of cognitive-load 
level, mean gamma correlations as a function of cognitive-load level, and mean operation-span scores for experiment 1.
  Cognitive load level
  1 Letter  4 Letters  6 Letters  8 Letters  o-Span
Percent of letters recalled  0.91 (0.02)  0.96 (0.01)  0.84 (0.02)  0.67 (0.02)   
on cognitive-load task
IRR  3.46 (0.13)  3.51 (0.14)  3.46 (0.13)  3.40 (0.14) 
REL  4.33 (0.14)  4.29 (0.14)  4.40 (0.13)  4.23 (0.13) 
Judgment sums  261.8 (8.3)  265.4 (9.2)  264.7 (8.4)  271.5 (9.6) 
Gamma  0.31 (0.03)  0.32 (0.03)  0.23 (0.03)  0.28 (0.03) 
o-Span      27 .86  (0.72)
SE are presented in parentheses. o-Span, operation-span; IRR, number of irrelevant alternatives identified in implicit memory word-fragment task, REL, number of 
relevant alternatives identified in the implicit memory word-fragment task; Sums, sum of probability judgments.
Sprenger et al.  Cognitive load and judgment
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science    June 2011  | Volume 2  |  Article 129  |  6tion between participants’ subjective probability judgments and 
their corresponding objective probability values. Mean gamma 
correlations are presented in Table 2. Analysis of covariance using 
o-span and the number of irrelevant alternatives identified in the 
word-fragment task as covariates revealed no effect of cognitive 
load on relative accuracy, and no significant relationships between 
o-span and gamma or between the number of irrelevant alterna-
tives identified and gamma (all p’s > 0.20). The results suggest 
that changes in judgment magnitude do not necessarily lead to 
changes in the rank order correlation between objective and sub-
jective probabilities.
experIment 2
Experiment 1 revealed a main effect of cognitive load on the sum 
of participants’ judgments. However, the effect of cognitive load 
on judgment was relatively small. One possibility for this small 
effect was our use of the cognitive-load manipulation, rather 
than a concurrent processing task (Rosen and Engle, 1997). Thus, 
we chose to replicate Experiment 1 using a concurrent dual task 
during judgment that would place a greater attentional demand 
on participants. In addition to replicating the effect of cognitive 
load on probability judgments, Experiment 2 was designed with 
two additional goals. First, we manipulated whether participants 
were primed with a relevant or an irrelevant alternative, rather 
than measuring the number of irrelevant alternatives generated 
by individuals post hoc. Second, we manipulated whether the dis-
tribution of irrelevant alternatives consisted of “strong” or “weak” 
items, where strength was defined by the items’ absolute frequency.
metHod
Participants
Participants were 73 undergraduate students enrolled in psychology 
courses at the University of Maryland. Participants received course 
extra-credit for participating in the experiment.
Design
The experimental design was a 2 (cognitive load: high versus low) × 2 
(prime type: relevant versus irrelevant) × 2 (strength of irrelevant 
alternatives: strong versus weak) mixed factorial, with cognitive load 
and prime-type manipulated within participants and strength of 
irrelevant alternatives manipulated between participants.
Procedure
The general procedure and instructions for Experiment 2 was the 
same as Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. First, after 
learning the four relevant distributions, participants learned an 
Thus, we also examined the relative accuracy of each participant’s 
judgments by computing a gamma correlation between each par-
ticipant’s subjective probability judgments and the corresponding 
objective probability values.
Table 2 presents the mean judgment sums for the four load 
conditions. As can be seen, participants’ judgments were well 
above 100%, indicating that participants’ judgments were subad-
ditive. This finding is consistent with a growing body of research 
that participants often give judgments that sum to more than the 
probability of the implicit disjunction (Tversky and Koehler, 1994; 
Dougherty and Hunter, 2003a,b; Dougherty and Sprenger, 2006; 
Sprenger and Dougherty, 2006).
Our main experimental hypothesis was that the magnitude of 
participants’ judgments should be related both to individual differ-
ences in working memory span and to cognitive load. Specifically, 
we expected that the magnitude of participants’ judgments would 
be negatively correlated with working memory span and would 
increase as cognitive-load increased. Table 3 presents the Pearson 
correlation coefficients between the sum of participants’ judg-
ments at each level of cognitive load and three predictor variables: 
o-span, mean number of irrelevant alternatives identified in the 
word-fragment task, and the mean number of relevant alterna-
tives identified in the word-fragment completion task. Consistent 
with our hypotheses and prior research, working memory span was 
negatively correlated with the sum of participants’ probability judg-
ments. Additionally, judged probability was affected by cognitive 
load; inspection of the mean sums in Table 2 reveals that there was 
about a 10% increase in the magnitude of participants’ judgments 
between the load 1 and load 8 conditions. Analysis of covariance 
using o-span score and the mean number of irrelevant alternatives 
identified in the word-fragment task as covariates, revealed a signifi-
cant effect of cognitive load on judgment, F(3,161) = 3.13, p < 0.05, 
with o-span as a significant predictor of judgment, F(1,163) = 8.32, 
p < 0.05. The number of irrelevant alternatives identified in the 
word-fragment task was not a significant predictor, F(1,163) = 0.04, 
p > 0.20
5. This pattern of results indicates that increases in cognitive 
load lead to an increase in judgment magnitude, and the presence 
of irrelevant alternatives did not affect judgment magnitude.
Dougherty and Sprenger (2006) argued that decreases in work-
ing memory capacity should lead to increases in judgment mag-
nitude without having a concomitant effect on relative accuracy. 
We measured relative accuracy by computing a gamma correla-
Table 3 | Pearson r correlations between operation-span, the number of relevant and irrelevant alternatives identified in the implicit memory task, 
and judgment sums as a function of cognitive-load level for experiment 1.
  Sum 1 letter  Sum 4 letter  Sum 6 letter   Sum 8 letter  irr  reL
o-Span  −0.284**  −0.238**  −0.187*  −0.218**  0.163* 0.184*
IRR  −0.081  −0.070 0.016  −0.056  
REL  −0.042  −0.004 0.001  −0.013  
o-Span, operation-span; IRR, number of irrelevant alternatives identified in the implicit memory word-fragment task; REL, number of relevant alternatives in the 
implicit memory word-fragment task; Sum, sum of probability judgments. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
5IRR was uncorrelated with judgment, but was correlated with o-span. Although 
not a significant predictor of judgment sums itself, IRR served as a suppressor va-
riable on o-span, and therefore was necessary for inclusion in the model.
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number aloud. This was done primarily to reduce motor-response 
interference since the cognitive-load task required a motor response. 
An experimenter sat with the participant during the judgment 
phase and coded the verbal probability judgments.
In the experiment, two distributions were judged under 
high cognitive load and two distributions were judged under 
low cognitive load. The level of cognitive load was blocked and 
counterbalanced across participants such that half of the par-
ticipants judged two distributions under high cognitive load 
first followed by two distributions under low cognitive load, 
whereas the remaining participants completed the experiment 
in the reverse order.
Practice session
As with Experiment 1, all participants engaged in a practice session 
to familiarize themselves with the individual tasks and to practice 
the tasks in the sequence they occurred in the main experiment.
results
Manipulation check: finger-tapping task
There was a significant difference in finger-tapping accuracy (meas-
ured as percent correct) between the high and low cognitive-load 
conditions, F(1,70) = 7.56, p < 0.05, indicating that participants 
found the high-load condition more attentionally demanding. In 
addition, there was a significant effect of the strength of the irrel-
evant alternatives on finger-tapping accuracy, with participants in 
the “high irrelevant strength” condition performing significantly 
less well than participants in the “low irrelevant strength” condition, 
F(1, 70) = 17.54, p < 0.0001. As is clear from the finger-tapping data 
presented in Figure 3, there was also an interaction between cogni-
tive load and strength of the irrelevant alternatives, F(1,70) = 4.53, 
p < 0.05. Univariate tests revealed that there was a main effect of 
strength of irrelevant alternative on finger tapping for participants 
in the high cognitive-load condition F(1,71) = 11.61, p < 0.05, but 
not for the low cognitive-load condition F(1,71) = 3.05, p = 0.09. 
These results offer the possibility that participants traded off pro-
cessing resources dedicated to the finger-tapping task in order to 
effectively inhibit the irrelevant alternatives, particularly when the 
irrelevant distribution that consisted of either eight weak items 
(each item presented two times during study) or two strong items 
(each item presented eight times during study). The asymmetry 
in the number of irrelevant alternatives allowed us to manipulate 
strength without varying the amount of time separating when 
participants studied the relevant distribution and when making 
their judgments.
Second, rather than engaging in a cognitive load task participants 
in Experiment 2 performed a concurrent finger-tapping task. 
Participants placed the four fingers of their right hand on the “j”, “k”, 
“l”, and “;” keys in typing position (i.e., index finger on the “j” key, 
middle finger on the “k” key, ring finger on the “l” key, and littlest 
finger on the “;” key). Participants were required to press each key 
when they heard a tone associated with that key. Each key was asso-
ciated with a different-pitched tone. The lowest pitch was associated 
with the “j” key, and the highest pitch was associated with the “;” 
key. In the low cognitive-load condition, the tone sequence always 
began with the lowest-pitched tone and incremented sequentially 
to the highest-pitched tone. Thus, participants pressed keys in order 
from index finger, to middle finger, to ring finger, and finally to lit-
tlest finger. The sequence then began again with the lowest-pitched 
tone and continued in the same cycle. In the high cognitive-load 
condition the tone sequence was random. Thus, participants were 
required to pay more attention to the tones because there was 
no predictable pattern to the sequence of tones. Participants had 
500 ms to respond before the next tone played. If participants did 
not respond in time, the trial was counted as incorrect and the next 
trial began. The pairing of auditory tones with finger presses departs 
somewhat from prior uses of the figure-tapping task. For example, 
Kane and Engle (2000) manipulated whether participants tapped 
fingers sequentially in order (index, middle, ring, pinky) or in an 
alternating sequence (e.g., index, ring, middle, littlest). Although 
the alternating sequence is clearly more difficult than the sequential 
sequence, it is also susceptible to practice effects. Thus, the degree 
to which the alternating sequence actually divides ones attention 
will actually decrease throughout the experiment. In contrast, our 
random version of the finger-tapping task is less susceptible to 
practice effects, because participants cannot anticipate which finger 
will need to be pressed on any given trial.
The third main difference between Experiments 1 and 2 per-
tained to the timing of the implicit memory task. In Experiment 
1, participants completed a word-fragment task after making each 
probability judgment. In Experiment 2, participants completed 
the word-fragment task before making each probability judgment. 
Thus, the word-fragment completion task in Experiment 2 served 
to prime participants to retrieve either items from the relevant 
distribution or items from the irrelevant distribution. The relevant 
primes were the two frequency-3 items from the relevant menu list. 
The irrelevant primes were two of the items from the irrelevant 
menu list. Half of the judgments were made following relevant 
primes and half were made following irrelevant primes. Judgments 
were always primed with an item from the meal being judged (i.e., 
if participants were asked the probability that Bob would order 
pancakes, the prime would be from the breakfast menu).
The final difference between Experiment 1 and 2 was that judg-
ments were made verbally, rather than by responding with a key 
press. Participants provided a numerical probability judgment 
FiGure 3 | Mean percent of correct finger-tapping responses as a 
function of cognitive-load level in the divided attention task for 
experiment 2.
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of the irrelevant alternatives. Overall there was no effect of the 
strength of the irrelevant alternatives on judgment, nor did the 
strength of the irrelevant alternatives interact with prime type or 
cognitive load (all p’s > 0.15)7.
As with Experiment 1, we examined relative accuracy of 
participants’ judgments by computing a gamma correlation for 
each participant between their subjective probability judgments 
and the corresponding objective probability values (excluding 
the frequency-3 items). Figure 4 presents the mean of these 
gamma correlations. There was a main effect of prime type on 
relative accuracy, F(1,68) = 4.63, p < 0.05, and a marginally sig-
nificant cognitive load by prime-type interaction, F(1,68) = 3.33, 
p = 0.07. The effect of prime type was limited to the high cogni-
tive-load condition. However, counter to what one might expect 
relative accuracy was actually poorer when participants were 
primed with a relevant alternative than when they were primed 
with an irrelevant alternative. This result was surprising. We offer 
a possible interpretation of this finding in the Section “General 
Discussion.”
experIment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 offer evidence that divided attention at judg-
ment perturbs the judgment process, and suggest that working 
memory capacity constrains the number of alternatives included 
in the comparison process. However, also important for this com-
parison process is the actual retrieval of alternatives from long-term 
memory. While retrieval has often been characterized as obligatory, 
the process of encoding is often assumed to be resource dependent 
(Craik et al., 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998; Fernandes and 
Moscovitch, 2000; Kane and Engle, 2000). Indeed, considerable 
research has illustrated that divided attention at encoding leads 
to substantial decrements in later retrieval. Moreover, individual 
differences in working memory capacity apparently can impact 
encoding processes, as well as retrieval processes (Rosen and Engle, 
irrelevant alternatives were strong6. As in Experiment 1, working 
memory span was a significant predictor of performance on the 
cognitive-load task, F(1,70) = 5.47, p < 0.01, and working memory 
span interacted with cognitive load, F(1,70) = 5.02, p < 0.05, in that 
participants with higher working memory span were less affected 
by the increase in cognitive load.
Probability judgments
We manipulated whether participants were primed with an item 
from the relevant distribution or from the irrelevant distribution. 
The primes from the relevant distribution were those items that 
occurred with frequency-3. Note that priming participants with 
an item from the relevant distribution might strengthen those 
items, such that they might be rated as more likely after they have 
been used as a prime. Indeed, a preliminary analysis comparing 
the judged likelihood of items used as primes with those that were 
not used as primes indicated that participants gave higher abso-
lute judgments for primed items than for non-primed frequency-3 
items, F(1,70) = 4.88, p < 0.05. We therefore chose to exclude all of 
the frequency-3 items from our analyses to avoid confounding the 
effect of strengthening the two frequency-3 items with the effect 
of divided attention on judgment.
Our primary experimental hypothesis was that participants’ 
judgments would be significantly higher under the high cognitive-
load condition than in the low cognitive-load condition. Consistent 
with this hypothesis, there was a main effect of cognitive load on 
judgment sums, F(1,69) = 5.56, p < 0.05. Participants made higher 
absolute judgments in the high cognitive-load condition than in 
the low cognitive-load condition (as given by the marginal means 
in Table 4). Although cognitive-load affected the magnitude of par-
ticipants’ judgments, there was no effect of prime type on judgment, 
nor did any of the interactions reach significance (all p’s > 0.15).
6One possible way to probe for the proposed tradeoff is to examine the correlation 
between performance on the judgment task and performance on the finger-tapping 
task. Evidence for such a trade off would be given by showing that finger-tapping 
accuracy decreases the effect of irrelevant alternatives decreased. Analyses exami-
ning this correlation failed to find this relationship.
Table 4 | Mean judgment sums as a function of cognitive-load level, 
relevancy of prime, and strength of irrelevant alternatives for 
experiment 2. 
  Level of cognitive load task
    Low High
Irrelevant prime  Weak irrelevant  178.16 (14.66)   196.59 (16.46)  
 alternatives
  Strong irrelevant  166.08 (14.66)  190.26 (16.46) 
 alternatives
Relevant prime  Weak irrelevant  196.75 (14.43)  195.08 (15.54) 
 alternatives
  Strong irrelevant  164.37 (14.84)  185.74 (15.54) 
 alternatives
  Marginal means  177 .10 (9.73)  192.02 (10.66)
SE are presented in parentheses. Sums, sum of probability judgments.
FiGure 4 | relative accuracy: mean gamma correlations between 
participants’ subjective probability judgments and the corresponding 
objective probability values for experiment 2.
7Note that it is possible that the strength of irrelevant alternatives had no effects on 
judgment because we confounded strength with the number of irrelevant alternati-
ves. The “strong irrelevant alternative” condition had only two alternatives, whereas 
the weak condition had eight alternatives.
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attentionally demanding. Further, as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
working memory span was a significant predictor (marginally 
in this experiment) of performance on the cognitive-load task, 
F(1,95) = 3.66, p = 0.059.
Recall
We expected that participants would retrieve fewer alternatives 
in the high cognitive-load condition than in the low cognitive-
load condition. Figure 5 presents the mean number of alternatives 
recalled for the high and low cognitive-load conditions as a function 
of distribution type. Consistent with our hypothesis, there was a 
main effect of cognitive load on the number of alternatives recalled, 
F(1,97) = 35.07, p < 0.01. This finding is consistent with prior work 
in the memory literature, and indicates that our manipulation of 
divided attention at encoding successfully affected later recall.
We further examined the mean presentation frequency of the 
alternatives participants retrieved as a function of serial recall 
position. We hypothesized that participants would tend to recall 
the strongest (most frequently occurring) items earlier and subse-
quently recall weaker items. Figure 6 shows that indeed,  participants 
1997; Kane and Engle, 2000). Thus, low working memory capacity 
can lead to poor encoding in long-term memory, which can cascade 
into poor retrieval (irrespective of whether one has full or divided 
attention at retrieval). If this assertion is correct, then encoding of 
judgment-relevant information should affect the number of alter-
natives participants can retrieve from long-term memory. Thus, 
we hypothesized that divided attention at encoding would lead to 
a decrease in the number of alternatives retrieved and used in the 
comparison process and that this decrease in retrieval would lead 
to an increase in judgment magnitude.
The basic experimental design was similar to that of Experiment 
2. The primary differences were that (1) we manipulated the distri-
bution of alternatives across two levels, (2) attention was divided 
at encoding instead of at judgment, (3) we required participants 
to engage in a recall task for two of the four menus, and (4) we 
administered an automated version of the o-span task (Unsworth 
et al., 2005).
metHod
Participants
University of Maryland students (n = 101) completed the experi-
ment in exchange for extra-credit in a psychology course.
Design
The experimental design was a 2 (cognitive load at encoding: high 
versus low) × 2 (distribution: balanced versus unbalanced) × 2 
(recall versus no recall) mixed factorial, with divided attention at 
encoding manipulated between subjects and distribution type and 
recall manipulated within subjects.
Procedure
The general procedure in Experiment 3 was the same as Experiment 
2 with the following exceptions. First, we manipulated the distribu-
tion of the alternatives. For two of the menus, the eight items were 
ordered with frequencies of: 15-10-7-1-1-1-1-1 (the unbalanced 
distribution). For the other two menus, the eight items were ordered 
with frequencies of: 10-5-5-4-4-4-4-1 (the balanced distribution). 
Second, we manipulated the recall of the menus. Each participant 
was asked to recall as many items as possible for one menu from 
the balanced distribution and for one menu from the unbalanced 
distribution. The recall of each particular menu was fully counter-
balanced and the order of recall was randomly assigned. The recall 
task took place after the learning phase, and prior to the judgment 
phase. Third, divided attention was manipulated during the learn-
ing phase (rather than at judgment). The divided attention task was 
he same finger-tapping task as in Experiment 2.
The experiment consisted of five phases carried out in the follow-
ing order: (1) practice (2) learning (this time while engaging in the 
finger-tapping task), (3) distractor task (to clear short-term memory: 
30 s of finger tapping), (4) recall (completed under full attention), 
and (5) probability judgment (completed under full attention).
results
Manipulation check: finger-tapping task
As in Experiment 2, there was a significant difference in finger-
tapping accuracy (measured as percent correct) between the high 
and low cognitive-load conditions, F(1,95) = 10.91, p < 0.01 indi-
FiGure 5 | Mean number of alternatives recalled for the high and low 
cognitive-load conditions as a function of distribution type for 
experiment 3.
FiGure 6 | Mean presentation frequency of recalled items as a function 
of serial recall position for experiment 3.
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bution: F(1,97) = 2.31, p > 0.10. An important question concerns 
whether recall mediates the relationship between divided attention 
at encoding and judgment. We tested this possibility by examin-
ing the effect of divided attention at encoding on judgment while 
controlling for the number of alternatives generated in the recall 
task. Consistent with the mediation account, the effect of divided 
attention at encoding on judgment was eliminated once the number 
of alternatives recalled was controlled both for the balanced condi-
tion, F(1,97) = 0.00, p > 0.05 and for the unbalanced condition, 
F(1,97) = 0.04, p > 0.05. This pattern of data suggests that probabil-
ity judgments are dependent on the number of alternatives recalled 
from long-term memory and included in the judgment process.
Table 5 presents correlations between working memory span, 
the number of alternatives recalled for the balanced and unbal-
anced conditions, and the sum of judgments for all distributions. 
Differences in working memory capacity correlated with both 
number of items recalled and the sum of participants’ probability 
judgments. We further examined whether the effect of dividing 
attention at encoding on subadditivity still held when controlling 
for working memory span, and found that the effect was statistically 
significant both before and after controlling for individual differ-
ences in working memory span, F(1,96) = 5.11, p < 0.05. Working 
memory span was itself a significant predictor of judgment sums, 
F(1,96) = 5.16, p < 0.05. Thus, individual differences in working 
memory span do not appear to mediate the effect of dividing atten-
tion on judgment.
general dIscussIon
Our thesis was that memory retrieval processes provide the input 
to the processes involved in judgment and decision making. To 
this end, we evaluated the impact of divided attention at both 
encoding and retrieval to examine how people make judgments of 
probability when the task requires that they generate hypotheses 
from   long-term memory. To our knowledge, no research has yet 
examined the effect of dividing attention on probability judgment. 
It was hypothesized that when participants generate hypotheses 
from memory, working memory capacity would constrain the 
number of hypotheses they considered while making probability 
judgments. Additionally, we hypothesized that dividing attention 
at encoding would decrease the number of alternatives actually 
generated from long-term memory. In general, considering fewer 
tended to recall high frequency items first, and that the mean fre-
quency of the recalled items decreased at each subsequent serial 
recall position.
Overall, the mean number of intrusions was low (High Cognitive 
Load:  M = 0.69, SD = 1.56; Low Cognitive Load: M = 0.24, 
SD = 0.59), as was the number of repetitions (High Cognitive Load: 
M = 0.04, SD = 0.20; Low Cognitive Load: M = 0.04, SD = 0.20), 
and additions (High Cognitive Load: M = 0.31, SD = 0.65; Low 
Cognitive Load: M = 0.16, SD = 0.42).
Probability judgments
Figure 7 plots the mean sum of probability judgments for the high 
and low cognitive-load conditions for all four distributions. As 
expected, there was a main effect of cognitive load on mean sum 
of judgments, F(1,97) = 6.55, p < 0.05: High cognitive load during 
encoding led to increases in judgment sums even though partici-
pants made judgments under full attention. Taken together, both 
sets of results support the hypothesis that dividing attention during 
encoding leads to a decrease in the number of alternatives recalled 
and included in the comparison process, which consequently leads 
to increased probability judgments. However, note that this effect 
was not anticipated by HyGene, which predicted a lower judgment 
magnitude at lower levels of encoding.
We also expected that participants who recalled more alterna-
tives for a given distribution would tend to make lower judgments, 
and have lower subadditivity for those judgments. Indeed, the sum 
of judgments was negatively correlated with the number of items 
participants recalled for that distribution of judgments [Balanced: 
r(101) = −0.47, p < 0.0001; Unbalanced: r(101) = −0.33, p = 0.001], 
and this was true across both high and low cognitive-load condi-
tions. Further, we examined whether probability judgments were 
related to the strength (presentation frequency) of recalled items 
by summing the presentation frequencies of each item recalled 
for each distribution. Indeed, the sum of recall strength was 
negatively correlated with the sum of participants’ probability 
judgments [Balanced: r(101) = −0.37, p < 0.0001; Unbalanced: 
r(101) = −0.35, p < 0.0001], and this was true across both high and 
low   cognitive-load conditions. However, the strength of recalled 
items did not account for additional variance in probability judg-
ments above and beyond the number of items participants recalled, 
FiGure 7 | Mean sum of probability judgments for the high and low 
cognitive-load conditions as a function of distribution type and recall 
condition for experiment 3.
Table 5 | Pearson r correlations among automated operation-span, 
number of items recalled, and subadditivity for experiment 3.
  Ao-span recall  recall 
    unbalanced balanced
JuDGMenT SuMS
Unbalanced recall  −0.238*  −0.345**  −0.396**
Unbalanced no recall  −0.251*  −0.359**  −0.436**
Balanced recall  −0.229*  −0.408**  −0.466**
Balanced no recall  −0.230*  −0.358**  −0.476**
Sums, sum of probability judgments; Ao-span, automated operation-span; 
Recall, number of items recalled. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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fidence in that hypothesis. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated 
that judgment magnitude increases when participants attention 
is reduced. This result extends previous research that found a 
negative relationship between working memory capacity and the 
magnitude of probability judgments (Dougherty and Hunter, 
2003a,b; Sprenger and Dougherty, 2006). Our manipulation of 
cognitive load allow us to rule out the possibility that the prior 
correlations between judgment and working memory were due 
to idiographic differences in math ability, knowledge of prob-
ability theory, or encoding processes. Instead, our data indicate 
that dividing attention during the judgment process constrains 
the number of alternative hypotheses that one includes in the 
comparison process, leading to increases in judged probability. 
Moreover, these data are consistent with HyGene’s prediction 
that lower levels of working memory capacity lead to increased 
probability judgments.
Dividing attention at encoding also affects subsequent judg-
ments, leading both to a decrease in people’s ability to retrieve 
alternatives and to an increase in judgment magnitude. Thus, 
errors and biases in the initial storage of information in long-term 
memory can cascade into errors and biases in judged probability. 
Such a dependence of judgment on memory is consistent with 
recent theoretical accounts that ground judgment processes in the 
underlying theoretical principles of memory (Dougherty et al., 
1999; Thomas et al., 2008). Nevertheless, the effect of encoding 
on subadditivity was inconsistent with the HyGene simulations, 
which anticipated that increased encoding would lead to increased 
subadditivity.
Why does HyGene predict an increase in subadditivity with 
increased encoding in the face of increased retrieval? We believe 
that the effect stems from an overweighting of the focal hypothesis 
by the model: increases in encoding quality lead to a disproportion-
ate increase in the strength of the focal relative to the alternatives. 
Although the model generates more alternatives with increases in 
encoding quality, the increase in strength resulting from increased 
encoding overwhelms the effect of including more alternatives in 
the comparison process. The net result, therefore, is that subad-
ditivity is predicted to increase as a function increased encoding, 
even though the model also predicts increases in the number of 
alternative hypotheses generated. Addressing this misprediction 
within the vector based model proposed by Thomas et al. (2008) has 
proved challenging (see Dougherty et al., 2010 for further discus-
sion on this point), though much more empirical and theoretical 
work is ongoing.
Taken together, the data presented here suggest a dual-role of 
working memory on judgment. On the one hand, working mem-
ory is important for judgment in that it constrains the number of 
alternatives one can include in the comparison process. This asser-
tion is supported both by individual difference studies showing 
the negative correlation between judgment and working memory 
span, as well as by the present research, which shows that concur-
rent processing demands during the judgment task can lead to 
increases in judgment. On the other hand, working memory can 
also have an impact on judgment by affecting how well informa-
tion is stored in long-term memory. Inasmuch as the input to the 
judgment process depends on the retrievability of information 
from long-term memory, factors that affect this retrievability will 
affect judgment. This assertion is clearly supported by the present 
research: divided attention during encoding led to a substantial 
increase in judgment magnitude, and this effect is completely 
mediated by people’s ability to retrieve the alternatives to the to-
be-judged event.
conclusIon
In many ways, our research parallels the debate regarding the 
effect of divided attention at retrieval. On the one hand, Craik 
et al. (1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998) suggested that retrieval 
processes are protected from the effects of divided attention. On 
the other hand, some researchers have suggested that attentional 
resources are needed for effective retrieval, particularly when the 
retrieval task requires the inhibition of irrelevant information 
(Rosen and Engle, 1997; Kane and Engle, 2000), or competition 
for the underlying memory representations by the secondary task 
(Fernandes and Moscovitch, 2000). While our research cannot 
definitively address whether divided attention during judgment 
impeded retrieval or placed restrictions on the number of hypoth-
eses included in the comparison process, it clearly showed that 
judgment is resource demanding when the task entails a compari-
son of hypotheses generated from memory. This is not to say that 
judgment processes are always resource demanding. For example, 
it is quite likely that simpler judgment tasks, such as the statement 
verification task (Wallsten and González-Vallejo, 1994; Wallsten 
et al., 1999) require little cognitive resources (Pleskac et al., 2008). 
At the same time, our research also concurs with findings showing 
that divided attention at encoding leads to decrements at retrieval 
(Craik et al., 1996; Naveh-Benjamin et al., 1998). However, the 
implications for divided attention at encoding go beyond simple 
memory tasks and affect the higher-level judgment and decision 
processes that work on the output of the memory system (cf. 
Pleskac et al., 2008).
In sum the present research is consistent with the view 
that capacity limitations constrain the number of alternative 
hypotheses included in a support-theory like comparison pro-
cess. Indeed, considerable research has revealed that people’s 
probability judgments are subadditive across a range of tasks, 
including  confidence memory for personal events (Mulford and 
Dawes, 1999), perceived probability of causes of death (Tversky 
and Koehler, 1994), and assessments of gambles (Fox and Tversky, 
1998). The present research suggests that estimates of probabili-
ties in these contexts will be inflated when cognitive capacity is 
low. Importantly, cognitive capacity can be low due to idiographic 
differences amongst decision makers, or by placing the decision 
maker under cognitive load. Thus, the present work adds to a 
growing body of literature illustrating the importance of working 
memory processes in hypothesis generation and probability judg-
ment: both lower working memory capacity and task-induced 
increases in cognitive load lead to increases in the perceived 
probability of events. We argue that cognitive-load reduces the 
number of alternatives used in the comparison process, which 
in turn leads to an increase in the judged likelihood of the focal 
hypothesis. In this way, our research suggests that errors, biases, 
or limitations in the memory retrieval process can cascade into 
errors and biases in judgment.
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in the jth position of the ith trace, and Ni = number of features 
where Pj ≠ 0 or Tij ≠ 0. The activation, A, of trace i is given by cub-
ing the value of S for each trace:
AS ii =
3.   (3)
HyGene assumes a conditional memory search process, wherein 
similarity is computed on only a subset of episodic memory, M, 
whose K traces contain data components sufficiently similar to 
the Dobs. Trace i is placed in the activated subset if its activation, Ai 
exceeds a threshold parameter, Ac:
AA ic ≥ .   (4)
Traces included in the activated subset are probed a second time 
by the hypothesis, component of the probe vector, with the sum 
of the activations across the K traces in the activated subset giving 
rise to the conditional echo intensity:
I
I
K
AA i
C
c = ∑ ≥
 
(5)
IC is the mean conditional echo intensity and K is the number 
of traces for which Ai ≥ Ac.
Hypothesis generation in HyGene begins by deriving a content 
vector from the subset of K traces activated by the initial retrieval 
cue, Dobs. The conditional echo content is a vector, Cc, whose jth 
element is given by Eq. 6,
CA T ii j
i
K
c =
= ∑
1
,
 
(6)
where Cc is the conditional echo content for the jth element and K 
is the number of traces for which Ai ≥ Ac. The echo content vector 
is normalized by the absolute value of the largest content value. 
This ensures that any positive content value greater than 1.0 and 
any negative content value less than −1.0 are perceived within the 
allowable feature range of +1 to −1, while preserving the sign of 
the original content values.
The conditional echo content process creates an unspecified probe. 
Hypothesis generation involves matching the unspecified probe 
against all known hypotheses in semantic memory in parallel and 
computing their activation values. Semantic memory employs a 
trace representation, but in contrast to episodic memory, semantic 
memory contains only a single representation of each hypothesis. 
Hypotheses in semantic memory whose semantic activation (As) is 
greater than zero define the semantic hypothesis space. Hypotheses 
are sampled probabilistically according to their activation value (c.f., 
Luce’s choice axiom, Luce, 1959), and are recovered from semantic 
memory and added to the SOC if their As exceeds ActMinH (a rule that 
specifies the minimum activation necessary for a semantic trace to 
enter the SOC). Although the initial value of ActMinH = 0, ActMinH is 
assumed to be dynamically updated based on the activation values 
of the hypotheses that have been generated from semantic memory. 
The generation process terminates when the total number or retrieval 
failures (the model fails to retrieve a novel hypothesis) exceeds TMAX 
(a retrieval parameter that determines how long the model searches 
semantic memory).
appendIx
model descrIptIon1
HyGene is implemented as a 6 step algorithm, which is initiated 
when the decision maker samples data from the environment and 
culminates with a set of potential hypotheses (and associated prob-
abilities) that explain the observed data.
Step 1: data sampled from the environment (Dobs) initiates the 
activation of traces in episodic memory that represent past 
instances of the target hypothesis that share features with Dobs.
Step 2: the traces in episodic memory that are activated above a 
threshold value (Ac) enable the creation of an unspecified probe 
that is used as a retrieval cue to generate hypotheses from 
semantic memory (steps 3 and 4).
Step 3: the unspecified probe is matched against known hypothe-
ses stored in semantic memory.
Step 4: hypotheses are generated from semantic memory and pla-
ced in the set of leading contenders (SOC) if they are sufficien-
tly activated by the unspecified probe. The generation process 
involves sampling and replacement. Hypotheses are sampled 
from semantic memory according to their activation value. 
Recovered hypotheses are placed into the SOC if their acti-
vation values are greater than the least active member of the 
SOC. The SOC is a working memory construct and therefore 
is limited in capacity. Hypotheses in the SOC are referred to as 
“leading contender hypotheses.”
Step 5: the posterior probability of each hypothesis in the SOC, 
p(Hi|Dobs), is given by comparing its memory strength to the 
memory strengths of all hypotheses in the SOC.
Step 6: hypotheses in the SOC are used to frame external informa-
tion search or hypothesis testing.
The algorithm can be implemented in any number of repre-
sentational systems. For our purposes, we use a system based on 
Hintzman’s (1988) Minerva 2 model, and Dougherty et al.’s (1999) 
Minerva-DM model, and outlined in detail in Thomas et al. (2008) 
and Dougherty et al. (2010). In this model, events are represented as 
ordered sets of features, where values of +1, 0, or –1 are randomly 
assigned to each cell with equal probability (Hintzman, 1988). 
Traces in memory consist of three types of information that are 
relevant to modeling decision-making phenomena: data, hypoth-
eses, and context. Encoding is modeled by a learning parameter, L. 
L determines the probability that each feature in the experienced 
event is encoded into the corresponding memory trace vector, 
where 0 < L < 1.
Retrieval involves computing the similarity between a probe 
vector, P, and each trace Ti, in episodic memory, M. The similarity 
metric (S) used in HyGene is the dot-product between the probe 
vector and the trace, as defined by Eq. 2
S
PT
N
i
ji j
j
N
i
=
= ∑
1 ,
 
(2)
1For a full calculated example of how HyGene works, see the Appendix of Thomas 
et al. (2008).
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Equation 7 normalizes the probabilities of the hypotheses within 
the SOC so they sum to 1.0. Excessive probability judgment and 
subadditivity arise when participants cannot maintain the full nor-
mative set of hypotheses in WM.
Hypotheses in the SOC are ordered according to their activation 
values, with the member of the SOC with the highest As interpreted 
as the best explanation of Dobs. The working memory capacity 
parameter, φ, specifies the upper limit of how many hypotheses 
can be held in working memory.
   Probability judgments for any given hypothesis are provided 
by comparing the memory strength for the to-be-judged hypothesis 
with the memory strength for alternative hypotheses in the SOC, 
as specified by Eq. 7,
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